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We present an extended version of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which agents with
limited memory receive recommendations about the unknown opponent to decide whether to play
with. Since agents can receive more than one recommendations about the same opponent, they
have to evaluate the recommendations according to their disposition such as optimist, pessimist, or
realist. They keep their firsthand experience in their memory. Since agents have limited memory,
they have to use different forgetting strategies. Our results show that getting recommendations not
always perform better. We observe that realist performs the best and optimist the worse.
I. INTRODUCTION
We live in a complex and crowded world. It is so
crowded that it is impossible to “know” everybody [1].
We know only a very small fraction of the population.
We operate within this network of known people. As we
interact with them, we classify them based on our first-
hand experience. Next time we need to interact again,
we use this information.
Since bold interaction with an unknown person may
not be a good idea, proceeding with firsthand experience
is not the only way that we use to make a judgement
about somebody. If we do not know a person, we ask for
recommendations from people that we already know. We
do that all the time in real life.
It is common sense that having recommendation is bet-
ter. In this work, we investigate whether having a recom-
mendation is always a better alternative in the context of
iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. Our findings indicate
that it is not always the case.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Optimism and pessimism
There are different orientations in humans to suggest
that what kind of things they could do in a given situa-
tion [2]. These orientations have an impact on trust [3].
Marsh presents dispositions in terms of how an agent esti-
mates trust [4]. Optimism, pessimism and realism are the
notions of dispositions of trust. Each different disposition
results in different trust estimations from an agent. An
optimist expects the best in people and is always hopeful
about the result of the situations. A pessimist, unlike
the optimist, sees the worst in people, always looks at
the situations through doubting eyes. While optimism
and pessimism are extreme cases, there are other cases
such as “realism”.
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B. Prisoners dilemma
Prisoners Dilemma is a two-person game, in which
players can choose between two different strategies: “Co-
operate” or “Defect”, without knowing their opponents
choice [5]. As summarized in Table I, if a person cooper-
ates while the other defects, cooperator gets the sucker
payoff S and defector gets the temptation payoff T . On
the other hand, if both players choose to cooperate, then
they both get the reward payoff R. Lastly, in the case of
mutual defection, both players get the punishment pay-
off P . In Prisoners Dilemma game, the payoffs should
satisfy both S < P < R < T and S + T < 2R.
TABLE I. Payoff matrix. (S, P,R, T ) = (0, 1, 3, 5).
Player X
Cooperate Defect
Player Y
Cooperate (R , R) (S , T)
Defect (T , S) (P , P)
For a single Prisoner’s Dilemma game, it is more ad-
vantageous to defect. But, when the game repeats, things
change. Iterated prisoner’s dilemma differs from the orig-
inal concept of a prisoner’s dilemma because players can
memorize the past interactions of their opponent and can
change their strategy accordingly [5, 6]. Players can learn
about the behaviors of their opponent and have the op-
portunity to penalize the agents for previous defective
decisions.
Iterated prisoner’s dilemma is used to understand co-
operation. Some evolutionary approaches, which pro-
motes cooperation, are investigated in the literature [7–
9]. Some works based on the reputation of the agents,
where agents cooperate with the ones that have good
reputation [5, 10, 11]. In this paper, we propose a non-
evolutionary model that also promotes cooperators. We
will see that cooperators can get the average payoff that
is larger than that of defectors.
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2C. Cetin and Bingol’s model
In the model proposed by Cetin and Bingol, agents
play Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which players
can accept or refuse to play with their partner [12, 13].
There are N agents in the population. Agents are not
pure cooperators or pure defectors. Agents have an inter-
nal parameter of ρ. Agent i cooperates with probability
ρi, which is called cooperation probability. There are two
types of agents, one group, called cooperators, has a ρ
value larger than 0.5. The other group, called defectors,
has a ρ value, which is less than 0.5.
1. Decision to play
Cetin adopts choice-and-refusal rule [14]: If an agent
“knows” that the opponent is a defector, then it refuses
to play. Otherwise, it plays. That is, two agents, say i
and j, are randomly selected and offered to play Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Both agents evaluate their
opponent and decide whether to play or not. (i) If an
agent does not know the opponent, then it has to play.
(ii) If it “knows” the opponent as “cooperator”, then it
plays. (iii) If i “knows” j as “defector”, then i refuses to
play.
2. Perception
In order agents to “know” each other, agents have some
memory so that they can keep track of previous games
with the same agent. Suppose agent i plays with agent j.
Agent i keeps two numbers in its memory. The number
cji is the number of times that j cooperates and dji is
the number of times that j defects when j plays with i.
Then the perceived cooperation ratio is defined as
tij = cji/(cji + dji). (1)
If the perceived cooperation ratio is larger than 0.5, i
considers j as cooperator, otherwise as defector.
3. Memory
We assume that each agent has an identical memory
capacity of size M ≤ N , called memory size. That is,
each agent can keep track of at most M opponents. Mem-
ory ratio, defined as µ = M/N ∈ [0, 1], is the percentage
of agents that can be kept in ones memory.
4. Forgetting strategies
Agent stores each opponent in a different slot in its
memory. Eventually, the agent will run out of memory
for M < N . After that point, to create memory space
for a new opponent, the agent has to “forget” a known
opponent. There are several forgetting mechanisms in-
vestigated in the model. (i) Players prefer to forget co-
operators first, denoted by FC. (ii) Players prefer to for-
get defectors first, denoted by FD. (iii) Players prefer to
forget randomly, denoted by FR [12].
III. PROPOSED MODEL
In Cetin and Bingol’s model, if an agent does not know
the opponent, it has to play [12, 13]. However, in real life,
we use our social network to obtain information about a
person that we do not know. We extend the model so
that agents can get recommendations about the oppo-
nents that they do not know.
A. Perception graph
Perceptions between agents can be represented as a
weighted directed graph as given in Fig. 1. In a perception
graph, agents are represented by vertices. When i plays
with j for the first time, two arcs will be created, namely,
one from i to j, and one from j to i. The perceived
cooperation ratio of j with respect to i, denoted by tij ,
is assigned to the arc from i to j as a weight.
As the game proceeds, symmetric connectivity between
agents can break due to forgetting mechanism, as in the
case of j and k. Suppose agents j and k played before.
Hence arcs (j, k) and (k, j) were created. Later, when
agent k chooses to forget j due to lack of memory space,
arc (k, j) and its corresponding weight tkj are removed
from the graph and its memory. Note that since j still
keeps k in its memory, arc (j, k) and tjk are intact.
i j
km
ln
tij
tji
tjktimtmi
tmk
tkm
tin
FIG. 1. Perception graph. Agents j, m and n are in the
1-neighborhood of i, while ` and k are not.
3B. Decision to play or not
In Fig. 1, suppose i is one of the selected agents to play.
As far as the opponent is concerned, there are three cases.
(i) Known opponent. For example, j is known by i. Then
all i has to do is to check the perceived cooperation ratio.
If tij > 0.5, it plays. However, if there is no data about
the opponent in its memory, as in the cases of k or `,
agent i plays with it in Cetin and Bingol’s model [13]. In
our model, agent i asks for “recommendations” from its
neighbors. There are two possible cases: (ii) Unknown
opponent without any recommendation. If nobody in
its neighborhood knows the opponent, i plays with the
opponent as in the case of `. (iii) Unknown opponent
with recommendations. Any neighbor, such as j, that
knows k, provides its own perception tjk about k. If
there were only one such agent j, decision of i would be
relatively easy: it will play if tjk > 0.5. But usually,
there are many such agents, e.g. j and m. Then i has
to evaluate conflicting recommendations received from
them.
C. Evaluation of recommendations
We define 1-neighborhood of i, denoted by Γ(i), as all
agents to which there is an arc from i. Note that Γ(i) is
composed of agents in i’s memory. Hence if an agent j
removed from i’s memory, it is also removed from Γ(i).
The set of recommender agents of i about k is denoted
by Ri(k) = {j ∈ Γ(i) | k ∈ Γ(j)}. For example, in Fig. 1,
Ri(k) = {j,m}. Note that, n is not in Ri(k) since n does
not know k. Every agent in Ri(k) gives a recommenda-
tion to i.
Once the agent receives the recommendations, the eval-
uation process begins. Evaluation of the recommenda-
tions by agents varies according to their dispositions. We
consider three types of dispositions:
(i) Optimists. An optimist agent i takes the maximum
of the recommendations that it receives [4], that is,
tik = max{tjk | j ∈ Ri(k)}.
(ii) Pessimists. A pessimist agent i takes the minimum
of the recommendations that it gets [4], namely,
tik = min{tjk | j ∈ Ri(k)}.
Optimist and pessimist agents are the opposite of each
other. We consider a third type in between.
(iii) Realists. A realist agent i takes the average of the
recommendations [4], that is,
tik =
1
|Ri(k)|
∑
j∈Ri(k)
tjk.
In the literature, there are realist agents that use the
mode or the median of the recommendations, too [15].
(iv) Self-assured (SA). To compare our agents with the
previous work [12, 13], we also consider agents that do
not ask for recommendations. They use their memory
only.
D. Perceived cooperation ratio
We modify perceived cooperation ratio given in Eq. 1.
According to Eq. 1, if agent j plays with i once and co-
operates, tij will be 1. Similarly, if j plays with i, say 10
times and cooperates in all of them, tij is still equal to 1.
However, in real life, the trustworthiness of a person who
was honest with us only once and that of a person who
was honest with us many times are not the same [16].
With this idea, we propose a different approach to calcu-
lations of perceived cooperation ratio. Perceived cooper-
ation ratio of j with respect to i is defined as
tij =
cji + 1
(cji + 1) + (dji + 1)
. (2)
With our new formula, if j plays with i once and co-
operates, tij becomes 0.66. On the other hand, if j plays
with i 10 times and cooperates in all of them, tij becomes
0.91. We feel that Eq. 2 provides more realistic percep-
tion evaluation. Note that both Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 produces
the same value of tij = 0.5 when cji = dji. Therefore,
since the maximum or the minimum are still either larger
or smaller than 0.5, optimist and pessimist agents are not
affected from this new definition of perceived cooperation
ratio. On the other hand, realist agents are affected since
average will be different.
E. Metrics
We want to compare the performances of the cooper-
ators and the defectors at the end of the game. To do
that we define average payoff of all agents in a set A as
PA =
1
|A|
∑
i∈A
payoff(i).
where payoff(i) denotes the accumulated payoffs by agent
i at the end of the game.
We have two sets of agents. The set C of agents with
cooperation probability ρ > 0.5 are considered cooper-
ators. The rest of the agents are called defectors and
denoted by D. Now, we can define payoff ratio as
φC = PC / PC∪D.
Note that we are interested in cases of φC > 1, where
cooperators have higher average payoff than the average,
that is, they perform better than defectors.
It is also possible that agents can misjudge the oppo-
nent, although they collect the recommendations. The
4number of misjudgments of cooperators as defectors is
denoted by ηcd. Similarly, ηdc is the number of misjudg-
ments of defectors as cooperators. Then, the accuracy
ratio of evaluations is defined as the ratio of the total
number of correct judgments to the total number of rec-
ommendations received ηr, namely,
δ = 1− ηcd + ηdc
ηr
.
IV. RESULTS
Given the model, it is possible to come up with many
possible scenarios. In this paper, we investigate some
of them. (i) We consider homogeneous agents, i.e., one
type of cooperators with cooperation probability ρ = 0.9
playing against one type of defectors with ρ = 0.1. (ii) In
our experiments, both cooperators and defectors use the
same forget strategy such as forget cooperators first.
(iii) Defectors are always self-assured, i.e. they do not
ask for a recommendation.
In contrast to defectors, cooperators do ask for a rec-
ommendation. Therefore, for a given parameter set, an
experiment consists of four different simulations where
cooperators are either (i) optimistic or (ii) pessimistic or
(iii) realist or (iv) self-assured playing against self-assured
defectors. We will be using plots such as Fig. 3(a) to
compare performances of different dispositions.
In each experiment, there are N = 100 agents, where
50 defectors play against to 50 cooperators, i.e., 50%
cooperators. We terminate the experiments after τ
(
N
2
)
pairs invited to play as in the case of Cetin and Bin-
gol’s model [13], where τ = 30. We use payoff matrix
of (S, P,R, T ) = (0, 1, 3, 5). We report an average of 10
realizations.
We run experiments for various memory ratios and re-
port our findings as a function of the memory ratio of
µ.
A. Self-assured agents
First of all, we consider agents that do not get rec-
ommendations as in the case of Cetin and Bingol’s
model [12]. Fig. 2 agrees with the finding of Ref [12]
that forgetting cooperators first (FC) is a better strategy
compared to random forgetting (FR) or forgetting defec-
tors first (FD). Even for FC, in order for cooperators to
go above average payoff, i.e., φC = 1, considerable mem-
ory ratio, µ = 0.3, is required. Strategies FR and FD call
for memory ratios more than 0.5 for φC > 1.
B. Forget cooperators first
We investigate forgetting cooperators first strategy
since it is better compared to FR and FD strategies ac-
cording to Fig. 2 and Ref [12]. Cooperators of a dispo-
sition, such as optimist, play against self-assured defec-
tors. Both cooperators and defectors use forget coopera-
tors first (FC) strategy. That is, if there is no space left
in the agent’s memory, a cooperator in the memory is
randomly selected and forgotten. If there is no coopera-
tor left in the memory, then a randomly selected defector
is forgotten.
1. Performance
As expected, Fig. 3(a) shows that self-assured agents
increase their performance as memory ratio increases.
Note that the self-assured curve in Fig. 3(a) and the FC
curve in Fig. 2 are the same.
Interestingly, in Fig. 3(a), we observe unexpected fluc-
tuations in the performances of the optimists, pessimists
and realists around µ = 0.2. Instead of increase, they de-
crease. Note that, although agents receive recommenda-
tions, their payoff ration is worse than self-assured agents
in this region.
For the values of µ > 0.2, performances start to
increase again but different dispositions have different
trends. Pessimists and realists are quick to recover and
pass φC = 1 threshold around µ = 0.25. They reach their
peak values on around µ = 0.45 and stay there. Opti-
mists have a different path. They cross φC = 1 threshold
around µ = 0.35. Their performance steadily increases
and takes its peak value close to µ = 1.
2. Number of requests
To understand the strange behavior in performance,
we collect data on recommendations.
There are recommendation requests, which receive no
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FIG. 3. Detailed analysis of forgetting cooperators first. (a)
describes payoff ratios of agents; (b) describes the number of
recommendation they receive; (c)describes the accuracy ratios
of evaluations of agents
response. Then, agent has to play. If it receives at
least one response, then it acts accordingly. Fig. 3(b)
plots ηr, the number of recommendation requests that
received at least one response. For all three dispositions,
ηr increases as µ increases but it reaches to its maximum
around µ = 0.2. Then different dispositions present dif-
ferent behaviors. Pessimists keep the same level around
φC = 9.5 × 104 for µ > 0.3. For realists, the number
of recommendation requests decreases till µ = 0.55 and
stays around φC = 6.5×104. For optimists, after its early
peak value at µ = 0.15, the number of recommendation
requests decreases almost to none.
3. Accuracy ratio
In Fig. 3(c), δ values of cooperators are shown. Since
50% of the population is cooperators, δ = 0.5 threshold
is marked with a dashed line. Note that the accuracies
of all dispositions are above this line.
Initially, accuracy decreases as the memory of the
agents’ increases for all dispositions. Around µ = 0.15,
dispositions start to deviate. For realists, accuracy in-
creases and reaches its maximum value of perfect accu-
racy, i.e. δ = 1, around µ = 0.4.
The accuracy of pessimists increases slightly and stays
just below δ = 0.8 for µ > 0.3. Behavior of optimists is
the most difficult one to explain. It keeps decreasing to
just above δ = 0.6 as µ approaches to 0.4, then it has a
sharp increase that reaches to above δ = 0.9 at µ = 0.55,
and then has a smooth decrease back to δ = 0.6.
V. DISCUSSION
Note that the way we set the experiment, cooperators
are of one type of disposition only, say realists. That
is, any recommendations from cooperators are coming
from realist cooperators. And they are evaluated by the
agent which is also a realist. We discuss each disposition
separately.
A. Optimists
Optimists, by their nature, have an optimistic view of
life. One positive recommendation is good enough for
them to play. Once they play with an agent, they record
this firsthand experience in their memory. Because of
this, they do not need to ask recommendations for the
same agent again. This explains the steady decrease of
recommendation requests in Fig. 3(b) for 0.2 < µ < 1.
For 0.2 < µ < 0.4 region in Fig. 3(c), its accuracy keeps
decreasing, too. That is, it requests less recommendation
and makes bad judgements. Yet it knows enough defec-
tors so that it can keep its payoff ratio increasing in this
region.
6B. Pessimists
Pessimists have the opposite strategy in playing. One
single negative recommendation is enough for a pessimist
not to play. If it does not play, then there will be no
record of the opponent kept in its memory. If the same
opponent is matched to play again, a pessimist has to ask
recommendation once more. This explains the high num-
ber of queries of recommendation even at µ = 1, where
there is enough memory to keep the entire population.
C. Realists
Realists are in the middle ground of optimists and pes-
simists. They play more than pessimists but less than
optimists. In the region of 0.2 < µ < 0.6 of Fig. 3(b),
similar to optimists, they play with new agents. From
that point on, their actions are similar to that of pes-
simists, that is, reject to play and keep asking the same
agent over and over again.
D. Anomaly around µ = 0.2
We further investigate the reasons for the surprising
behavior in the region 0.15 < µ < 0.25. First, we ask
whether they receive recommendations or not? By check-
ing ηr values around µ = 0.2, one can observe that the
optimist, pessimist and realist agents received sufficient
recommendations. Then, we need to investigate how ac-
curately they evaluate those recommendations. One ob-
serves that accuracy declines as µ go from 0.1 to 0.2,
which can explain the drop in performance φC in the
same region.
In this region around µ = 0.20, memory is quite small.
One can hold at most 25% of the population while 50% of
it are defectors. Because of the forgetting strategy of FC,
one keeps perceived defectors in the memory. Therefore
any recommendation given would be towards no play.
If a neighbor misjudges a cooperator as a defector, this
misjudgment prevents others from play with that coop-
erator. This escalation prevents others from play with
this cooperator and gain points.
E. Possible extensions
This work can be expanded in various ways. First,
in our current model, the recommender agent gives its
sincere perception as a recommendation. That is, even a
defector agent provides its genuine opinion. This may not
be the case in real life. Second, we considered N = 100
with 50% cooperators. One wants to try larger N values
as well as different percentages. Third, we consider ho-
mogenous agents. One type of cooperators plays against
one type of defectors. In real life, there are always mix-
tures of all kinds. In such heterogeneous environments
are difficult to investigate but definitely much more real-
istic. Fourth, there are possible extensions for defectors.
Our defectors are self-assured. One may consider defec-
tors that also use recommendations. More than that, our
defectors refuse to play with perceived defectors. Given
a payoff matrix of (S, P,R, T ) = (0, 1, 3, 5), a realist de-
fector would always choose to play since it has nothing to
lose. Payoff matrices with negative entries as in the case
of [13] is another possibility to investigate. Finally, any
two agents play τ times on average. Different τ values
should be investigated.
VI. CONCLUSION
We investigated the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
where agents get recommendations if they do not know
the opponent. Although we expect better performance
as memory capacity increases, the performances of all
dispositions drop around µ = 0.2 region, in which agents
that do not get any recommendations perform better.
After that region performances recover. Realists have
the best performance while the optimists have the worst.
In this work, we report, in detail, strong cooperators
and strong defectors with ρ = 0.9 and ρ = 0.1, respec-
tively. We also investigate mild cooperators and defectors
such as ρ = 0.75 and ρ = 0.25, and we obtained similar
results.
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